Jentleson notes that the Commerce and Agricultural Departments often oppose sanctions whereas the State and Defence departments often support them [6]. Sanctions may result in return sanctions that would affect US businesses and agriculture whereas the State and Defence departments are not constrained by these domestic forces.
He also notes that these conflicts also occur between the military branches [7]. Involvement in foreign policy activity may garner higher funding and the opportunity for better equipment and more personnel. They note that there was constant fighting between USAID and the State and Defence departments marked by preference over project length, manpower and resources [9]. In turn, this created a divide with the military who saw the civilian agencies as incompetent in their ability to complete tasks and complete them on time [10].
The type of department, in terms of domestic and foreign, has also become a site of conflict. There is often a sense from those on the ground in foreign policy theatres that those in Washington fail to understand the situation on the ground and that their attempts to micromanage from miles away are damaging their ability to succeed [12]. Brian Hocking rightly notes that these conflicts will only increase [13].
The complexity of contemporary foreign policy dilemmas is increasingly requiring the presence of what were once solely domestic departments and agencies. What we see here is not only how individual departments engage in BPM style politics between themselves, but also how groups of departments defined by their seniority and locality engage in broader conflicts.
On both levels of analysis, we can see how the BPM environment controls the US foreign policy apparatus and therefore provides a good evaluative framework. To analyse its value though we must not only embrace its obvious merit but also handle its detractors.
Stephen Krasner rightly points out that the BPM has some extremely damming viewpoints in regards to contemporary democracy [15]. If we make bureaucrats and their conflicts responsible for foreign policy then whom do we hold accountable? Whilst he is right that it raises serious questions about the accountability of modern democracies, his approach is far too normative.
Using the BPM to evaluate foreign policy allows us to recognize reality for what it is. It is only then that we can set about changing it. Alden, Amnon and Art dedicate significant space to the problems of the BP, such as its failure to determine in what context conflict and bargaining have most effect [17] and that other factors or the situation itself are a more important determiner [18]. The BPM does not have to outline when it is most prevalent — merely that it is prevalent.
This does not mean that it is wrong — only partially incomplete. In regards to other factors we unfortunately lack the space to deconstruct them one by one but the American bureaucracy is shielded from the outside world, not only by brick walls but by tradition, identity and purpose.
Whilst external factors will naturally permeate through, they are insignificant when compared to the anarchic conflict of policymaking and the forces and drivers that underpin it. Broadly speaking we can see that even if some criticism is valid, it is either because the BPM fails to either describe everything in totality or because its detractors give undue value to external forces.
The reason for this is that the BPM fails to explain the unique agency of the President. How he can rise above the conflict of his bureaucrats and make decisions. These abilities are not unconstrained though.
For the second part of the essay we will briefly look at the agency of the president before looking at its constraining relationship within the wider bureaucratic structure. The president is the creator of the bureaucratic structure [19]. He can appoint and dismiss as he chooses.
He does not have to engage in bargaining and can rise above the conflict. If he faces conflict he can simply override it or utilize other avenues unavailable to the wider bureaucracy.
His position at the top means that as Krasner [20] and Jentleson [21] suggest, the ultimate decision-making and responsibility for those decisions rests with him. This decision-making role is enhanced during periods of crisis [22].
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