Imf programs who is chosen and what are the effects 2005

Department of Economics. Hutchison, Frankel, Jeffrey A. Jeffrey A. Rose, Anne O. Krueger, Michael D. Barro, Robert J, Jonathan Temple, Mohsin S. Khan, Michael Mussa, Full references including those not matched with items on IDEAS Most related items These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.

Butkiewicz, James L. Easterly, William, William Easterly, Hutchison, Michael M. Carlos De Resende, James L. James Vreeland, Barry J. Eichengreen, Robert J. Share Twitter LinkedIn Email. Working Paper DOI Issue Date May Acknowledgements and Disclosures.

Loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional staff at the IMF and when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States and other major shareholding countries of the IMF.

These results are of considerable interest for their own sake. More importantly for present purposes, the results provide instrumental variables for estimating the effects of IMF loan programs on economic growth and other variables. This instrumental estimation allows us to sort out the economic effects of the loan programs from the responses of IMF lending to economic conditions. The estimates show that a higher IMF loan-participation rate reduces economic growth.